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74)
common lodging-houses. It is a general Act consolidating and amending the laws relating to public
health in London. It deals with nuisances offensive trades smoke consumption removal of refuse watercloset
regulations unsound foods provisions as to water notification and prevention of infectious diseases
and the like. No doubt some of its provisions are applicable to common lodging-houses in common with
all other houses but it is noticeable that section 94 which alone refers to houses let in lodgings and which
enables the sanitary authority to make by-laws as to them expressly excepts common lodging-houses
from this class therefore leaving them to be dealt with under the Acts of 1851 and 1853. We conclude
then that there has been no legislation which adopts or proceeds upon a recognition of the law as
declared in Booth v. Ferrett.
Oar answers therefore to the questions put to us in the case are as follows :—As to the first question
we say that this case is not distinguishable in principle from the case of Booth v. Ferrett. As to the
second question we say the case of Booth v. Ferrett was wrongly decided. As to the third question we
say that the Respondent's lodging-house was a common lodging-house within the Acts of 1851 and 1853.
These answers render it unnecessary to consider the question of the admissibility of the evidence
tendered by the Appellants and rejected by the magistrate.
The result is that the Appeal will be allowed and that the case will be remitted to the learned
magistrate with an intimation of our judgment upon it Under the circumstances there will be no costs
of the Appeal and having regard to the decision of Booth v. Ferrett on which the Respondents were
justified in acting the learned magistrate will no doubt think that the smallest nominal fine will meet the
justice of the case.
We desire to say that we should regret if the result of our decision should seriously interfere with
the humane work of the Respondent. We do not think it will but whether it will or not the law must be
observed. We have read the careful regulations framed for the good government of the " Harbour " and
the Respondent's other similar houses and have noticed the anxiety manifested in those rules not only to
insure observance of all conditions necessary to secure cleanliness and good health and to prevent the
growth and the spread of disease but also to observe the law whatever that law may be. Indeed part 2
chapter 2 rule 24 of the Respondent's regulations expressly provides that every shelter shall be fitted in
accordance with the requirements of the sanitary authorities of the district. On the other hand we
trust that those who are charged with the enforcement of the law will do all they can consistently with
their duty and consistently with their effecting the objects of the law to avoid anything like harshness
or unreasonableness in its enforcement.
The Victoria Home, Whitechapel-road.
Logsdon v. Trotter.
Mr. Justice Channell—In this case which was argued before us yesterday we have now to give
judgment and I think myself it is a case of some difficulty for reasons which I will explain. We have
the advantage of having had quite recently an authoritative decision upon a point which is extremely
similar namely upon the question whether a Salvation Army shelter was a common lodging-house and
we had yesterday the judgment in that case read and subsequently when the facts of this present case
were read by Mr. Jelf from the special case I confess that it struck me in the first instance that the two
institutions were practically identical. But Mr. Daldy pointed out some distinctions between them he
pointed out (and I think when you look at the facts there is no doubt about it) that thiB is if I may say so a
somewhat higher class of thing than the Salvation Army shelter and consequently if we did that which
is so very easy to do and much the most usual thing for us to do namely simply say that the facts of this
case are so like the facts in the other case that we cannot distinguish between them we are starting the
Courts upon a sort of progress which anybody who knows case-law at all knows is constantly taking place
—We say this case is so like the other that we cannot distinguish it. Then there comes another case of
Logsdon v. Somebody else which is one in which the London County Council take proceedings. That
case is very like this one and so you go on until you land yourself into deciding that something is a
common lodging-house which nobody who began at the beginning would say was a common lodginghouse.
Consequently it is very necessary it seems to me to look not only at whether this is so near the
other one that one is bound to say that if one is within the description of " common lodging-house " the
other is. But one ought to look at it a little differently from that and one ought to look at the previous
case and try and find out if one can (it is not always easy and I am not sure that it is easy in this case)
where they drew the line and then see not merely whether this case is only one very small step beyond
the other case but whether that small step does not take you over that line so laid down. It is very
necessary as I think to approach the case from that point of view otherwise we are starting the Courts
upon that sort of progress which they have often gone through in similar cases which led them to a
point to which they never would have gone but for that gradual progress. That being so it seems to
me that we have got to look and see if we can what principle was laid down in this case of Logsdon v.
Booth to define what was a common lodging-house.
Now there have been I think four different things mentioned in the various cases upon the subject
as either the only tests or some of the possible tests as to whether a thing was a common lodging-house
or not. One of those namely the one that was applied in Booth v. Ferrett as to the institution being one
not carried on for profit has been conclusively disposed of by the decision of Logsdon v. Booth. One of
the four therefore has been got rid of altogether and of course it is the one upon which the present case
before us of Logsdon v. Trotter was in fact decided because at the time that was before the magistrate
Booth x. Ferrett was standing as an authority and this case coming within the principle laid down in
that case was decided by the magistrate upon that case. But it does so happen that the case before us
does set out the facts sufficiently I think for us to be able to form our judgment. It might have
happened and Mr. Daldy suggested that it did happen I think in this case that in consequence of the
case being stated practically upon another point he thought that this would have to go back to the
magistrate for him to find again other facts and to consider whether or not Booth v. Ferrett having
been disposed of this case came within the description of "common lodging-house" upon other grounds.
But I think that the facts are sufficiently found by the magistrate for us to be enabled to deal with it.
Now the other three matters that have been mentioned are these first of all that " common lodginghouse
" means a low class lodging-house a lodging-house for people of low class I do not mean to use the
word offensively because of course they cannot help it very often but a class of society which are dirty
likely to be diseased and so on. Now all the cases I think agree that that is one element and that unless
the place that you are considering is a lodging-house for people of that class it does not come within
the description "common lodging-house" but it does not quite follow that that is conclusive. That is
necessary and if that is necessary I think that element existsin the present case. It is true that in this case
efforts have been made by the benevolent people who carry on the institution to raise these poor people
and make them cleaner and better in many ways and the result is that a certain number of their inmates
are somewhat above the average of the people in a common lodging-house, but it is only a certain number
What is found on the bottom of paragraph 6 of the case is that " a certain number of the lodgers are of
a better class than the 'dosser' or the inhabitants of an ordinary common lodging-house but substantially
the lodgers are of the ' dosser' description." Now that being so this institution fulfils that