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admitted was fixed in the bar where the purchases were made. This
notice, which was seen and read by the Inspector and his agent, was in
the following terms:—
"All spirits sold at this establishment are of the same superior
quality as heretofore, but to meet the requirements of the Food
and Drugs Acts, they are now sold as diluted spirits; no alcoholic
strength guaranteed."
On 12th March, the Chairman, in giving the considered decision of
the Bench, said they were of opinion that in this case the notice
exhibited was ambiguous and misleading, and did not convey to the
mind of the purchaser the fact that when he asked for rum he was
being supplied with spirit which was more than 35 degrees under
proof. The Bench found that the sale was to the prejudice of the
purchaser, and it therefore followed that there must be a conviction.
The due and regular administration of the laws relating to the sale of
food and drugs was of supreme importance, and, if this had been at all
a bad case, a heavy penalty would have been inflicted. Under all the
circumstances, the defendant would be fined £1 and 5 guineas costs.
The Bench agreed to state a cose.
The second case was heard; but was adjourned in view of the
notice of appeal that was given in the case of Sample No. 27.
The summonses against the other vendors were adjourned,
pending the result of the prosecution in the case of Sample No. 27.
The appeal against the decision of the Hampstead Justices was
heard in the King's Bench Division on October 22nd, before the Lord
Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Avory, and Mr. Justice Salter. Mr. Cecil
Whiteley, K.C., and Mr. Roland Burrows appeared for the appellant;
and Mr. Singleton, K.C., and Mr. S. G. Turner for the respondent.
Held, in a considered judgment reviewing all the authorities, that
the two questions involved were:—(i) What was the substance of the
information which must be given to the purchaser? —which was a
question of law. The purchaser must be told in substance that the
thing which he was getting was not the thing he asked for. (ii) Were
the steps taken sufficient, in all the circumstances, to convey this
information to an average purchaser?-which was a question of fact
for the Justices. The saying that "everyone is supposed to know
the law" is too general. The maxim is: Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
It cannot be accepted as a defence against a charge of breach of the
law. But, in considering this notice, the Justices would properly