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and therefore the said powers have no application to the premises and
works of the Respondents"; secondly, "That the power to make byelaws
conferred on the London County Council by Section 202 of the
of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, and by Section 40 of the
Local Government Act, 1888, so far as the same involves interference
with or control of the premises and works of the Respondents, is inconsistent
with the powers conferred upon the Respondents by the London
and North Western Railway Act, 1912, and therefore to the extent
aforesaid the said bye-laws have no application to the premises and
works of the Respondents"; and thirdly and finally, "The powers
claimed and exercised by the Appellant as aforesaid are inconsistent
with the provisions of Section 16 of the Railways Clauses (Consolidation)
Act, 1845, incorporated with the London and North Western
Railway Act, 1912, under which the Respondents have power to
construct such works of the nature specified in the said section as they
think proper."
The question whether the learned Magistrate was right in this case
is the question which has been often raised under different special
Acts: whether the special Act is inconsistent with the general Act so
as to produce the result that it is to the special Act, and not to the
general Act, that you must look in order to ascertain the law relating
to the matter. The alleged inconsistency here is clearly formulated in
the three-fold contention of the present Respondents. The argument
for the Appellant, which has been put with great force, as is only to be
expected from Mr. Macmorran, is that, in order to ascertain whether
there is a kind of inconsistency relied upon, one ought to look, not to
the Statutes alleged to be inconsistent, and to the powers by those
Statutes respectively conferred, but at particular bye-laws, on the one
hand, and in this case at particular conveniences, as they are called,
on the other hand, with special reference in each case to the individual
question whether in the particular case referred to the work might or
might not have been carried out in fact in such a way as to comply
with the particular bye-law. In my opinion, that is not merely a novel
proposition, but a proposition which cannot be sustained. It appears to
me to be in conflict with the principles laid down in a long series of
cases, including, for example, the case of the City and South London
Railway Company v. London County Council, reported in 1891, 2 King's
Bench, at page 513, and not least to the case of the Surrey Commercial
Docks v. Bermondsey Corporation, reported in 1904, 1 King's Bench, at