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64
materials. I have come to the conclusion, therefore, that although
the question is not one, in my opinion, free from difficulty, that
the rendering of sweet fat as understood in this business of oleo
making is not what the statute was directed against as a nuisance
meant by tallow melting. A more difficult question is raised in
reference to the minor branch of the defendant company's
business, in which the fat is rendered by means of steam digestors
In this connection reliance has been placed by the prosecution
on the transactions which took place between the defendant
company's brokers and Messrs. John Knight & Co., Ltd. In the
early part of last year, on the 13th of April, they sold to John
Knight and Co. what was described in the contract note as "5
tons Deptford No. 2 rendered fat," and Messrs. John Knight & Co.
paid for it; but instead of sending the company the invoice to be
receipted they sent a credit note made out by themselves, in
which the description of the article was changed to "No. 2 town
tallow." This credit note was receipted by the clerk in the
employment of the defendant company's broker, who, so far as I
can know, did not notice the alteration made. That is not a
matter which, in my opinion, can be used as evidence as against
the defendant company. In another case cited the material was
described as tallow, but the explanation given for this fact is that
the railway company had no special rate for oleo, and the word
"tallow" was used, as the only one suitable under the circumstances.
Now oleo forms 90 per cent. of the company's traffic, and
this was dealt with by the railway company as tallow; but that does
not alter the fact that the article was not tallow but oleo. The
position, then, is this: on the one hand is an article which it is
now admitted is only capable of being made into soap or candles
and is purchased only by soap makers, and on the other hand