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that the School Board, that actual occupant, cannot be what has been
called a hypothetical tenant. A hypothetical tenant is only the "a
tenant" of this section, and when one asks why should the actual
occupier not be a possible tenant, there seems to me to have been no
answer given in the whole course of the argument except one.
It is said that the School Board are not to be deemed a possible
hypothetical tenant because although they actually occupy the property,
and although, therefore, it is an object of great desire to them, yet
inasmuch as they can make no profit out of it, declare no dividend and
accumulate no profits, therefore they are not to be deemed hypothetical
tenants. It seems to me you might just as well say that a man who
occupies a house not for the purpose of a shop, and not for the purpose
of making money but for the purpose of providing for his own comfort
and the comfort of his wife and family is not a hypothetical tenant.
The real way in which the question of sterility, as it has been called
has been introduced into this section is this: Taking property of
ordinary character the general reason why rent may be reasonably
expected to be obtained is that there will be a beneficial ownership of
the property in the hands of the person who takes it. That is the
general rule. Therefore it has been said that where property produces
nothing, you cannot reasonably expect that anybody will pay anything
for it. But it does not follow that because property may produce no
actual income in the hands of the occupier therefore no rent can
reasonably be expected to be obtained for it. No better illustration of
the fallacy can occur than the present case where this particular School
Board has the object of its highest desire, a Board School, and they
might reasonably be expected to pay a large rent for it, although they
can make no profit out of it in their own hands. The fact is the section
has nothing to do with the objects for which the tenants may take it, it
has nothing to do with whether the tenant will or wil not make profit
out of it. The only question is, is there a tenant who may reasonably
be expected to take it for any motive, for profit, for the performance of
his duty, for his own pleasure, for his curiosity, or for any other motive
which actuates a human being? With those motives the section has
nothing to do. You have merely to enquire whether there is any
reasonable expectation that a tenant can be found and what is the
annual rent which may reasonably be expected to be paid by that tenant.
That being so the section answers itself, and the whole of this argument
has been derived from a misapprehension of the suggestions which have
been made in the course of the discussion in this case.
But then it is said that in the present case the Court has arrived at
its conclusion by certain tests, some of which at least are inaccurate and
untrue. The tests suggested are three. Now those tests, according to