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60
Lordship referred to the contract, and said that he did not mean to
decide anything contrary to Lecky v. Ogilvy" or "Parker v. Schuller."
There were numbers of such cases to show that under c.i.f. contracts,
and under contracts where the vendor had to deliver the goods to a
carrier, that, as a rule, was delivery to the purchaser. But that was
not the question here. The question was what was the meaning of
the words of the present contract 1 The vendor was only described as
being of the county of Nottingham. The purchaser knew nothing as
to where the milk was coming from. She had no means of identifying
or following it till she received it at Wanstead Park. If one was to
read the words "Wanstead Park" connected only with "carriage
paid," no place of delivery was named at all. It was clear that the
place of delivery was Wanstead Park. Was there any difference
between "to" and "at" Wanstead Park 1 In this case he thought
that there was no distinction on that ground. It would be reducing
the contract to an absurdity to say that the words "to Wanstead
Park" did not indicate the place at which the milk was to be delivered
to the purchaser, and as there was no other place of delivery mentioned
this was a contract by which the property became the purchaser's and
the purchase became complete when the milk was delivered to the
respondent at Wanstead Park. As to the argument that because the
milk was some time at Wanstead Park Station the respondent ought to
prove that it was not tampered with there, the finding in paragraph (e)
of the case practically amounted to this, that Bell, though he had
other duties to perform, and it was not his duty to watch the churns
the whole time, practically did look after them, and did not allow
them to be tampered with. The burden suggested was an impossible
one for the respondent to discharge, and to hold that she was liable to
be convicted unless she negatived the possibility of the churns being
tampered with during the short time they were at Wanstead Park
Station, would not lead to substantial justice or to a fair application
of the Act.
The other learned Judges agreed; and the appeal was accordingly
dismissed.
It is needless to say that in the appellant's view the above
decision is most unsatisfactory, and I think I can give good grounds
for such a view.
In the first place, the chief point upon which the opinion of the
Divisional Court was desired, namely, whether the agreement and