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for that purpose. On the facts as above stated I held that the room was under
the appellant's control within the meaning of the said third By-law. I therefore
convicted the appellant, and I fined him £5 and ordered him to pay £2 2s. for
costs. The question for the opinion of the Court is—Whether the premises so
constructed and let as aforesaid were a lodging-house within the meaning of
the said By-laws. If the Court is of that opinion, then my said decision is to
stand; if the Court is of the contrary opinion, my said decision is to be quashed,
or such other Order is to be made herein as to the Court may seem just."
Judgment.
The Lord Chief Justice: If this house under the circumstances stated in
the case does not fall within the Section, I fail to see what house would fall
within the Section. The Magistrate has found as a fact that it is an ordinary
six-roomed house with a common staircase, each pair of rooms being occupied
by a separate family, and it is within the words " house occupied by members
of more than one family "the Magistrate has found that, and whether it is a
question of degree or a question of fact makes no difference. He has found it
as a fact, and if there was evidence upon which he could so find it we should
not upset it. It was conceded that the case of Weatheritt v. Cantlay was
contrary to that. I asked Mr. Hinde to read the judgment in that case, which
he kindly did, and it seems from that that the test which the Magistrate has
applied here is the right test. In that case there were a number of floors
containing separate tenements which might be defined to be separate houses,
and they did not cease to be separate houses because they were under one
common roof. I there used the expression, which I repeat, that if that were
not the true test, all blocks of buildings occupied as flats would be places
occupied by more than one family and would come within the purview of the
Section. I think that is an observation which is entitled to weight. I think
that here the Magistrate was perfectly entitled to come to the conclusion that
this is a house within Section 94 of the Act.
Mr. Justice Wills: I am of the same opinion. I think this is a house, or
the Act of Parliament would be of no use.
Mr. Justice Channell: I agree on the ground that it is a question of fact.
I have a little doubt whether the separate tenements were separate houses, but
I think that upon the facts as found the Magistrate was right.
Mr. Muir: The appeal is dismissed with costs.
The Lord Chief Justice: Yes.
Weatherett v. Cantlay.
This case was quoted in the Mcdical Officer of Health's Annual Report for
1901, page 96, and the following case (Roots v. Beaumont) is also
interesting:—
Roots v. Beaumont.
Queen's Bench Division. April 6th, 1886.
Public Health Act, 1875, Section 90.—By-laws as to Houses let in Lodgings.
A local board made by-laws requiring registration, &c., from the landlord of
a lodging-house, and defined "lodging-house," to mean "a house or part of a
house which is let in lodgings or occupied by members of more than one family
B. let four unfurnished rooms of her house to M. and his family.
Held: The Justices were wrong in holding that B. did not come within the
meaning of the definition as landlord of a lodging-house. (L.I.J.P., p. 197.)