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Justice is satisfied by Information on oath that there is reasonable ground for
such entry." Now it is not, if he is satisfied that the right exists, because it
starts with the assumption that the right exists, but then it says that he must
be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for the entry; that is to say, he
must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for exercising that right
which ex hypothesi exists, because otherwise the section would not apply at all
—he must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for exercising that
right in respect of the premises in question. It follows from that that the
mere statement that the right does exist cannot be of itself a ground for
saying "I want to exercise it in this particular case." You must say something;
and this lady, for some reason, did not say anything at all. She says
"Very well, in every case where the right exists, without giving any reason
for saying why I want to go into these particular premises, the Magistrate is
bound to give me the right to enter into these particular premises." I
venture to think the Legislature has said clearly: No. They have interposed
a stipulation that the Magistrate is to be satisfied that there is a reasonable
ground for exercising the right in the particular case. Something must be
said. In this particular case they said nothing; and consequently, as Mr.
Macmorran has said, if that is so, you can go to a Magistrate, and go into every
house within the district. Possibly if she had said there were special circumstances
existing with reference to the school, such as the various things which
have been suggested, that might have been enough; but she has not said
anything at all except that the right does in fact exist. It is quite clear that
the existence of the right cannot be a reasonable ground for exercising the
right, when it follows a section which begins by assuming that the right does
exist.
It seems to me, therefore, quite clear that the Magistrate was right in the
decision in this case, and that the appeal must be dismissed.
Rights of Entry.
The powers of entry of sanitary authorities or their officers may be
classed as;—
(a) Entry on premises in general—
(1) For general purposes.
(2) For special purposes.
(b) Entry on particular premises for various purposes—
(1) Dwelling premises.
(2) Premises other than dwelling premises.
(c) Entry on certain premises for a special purpose.
Premises in general will include ordinary dwelling-houses and also particular
premises. Particular premises will include certain dwelling premises, as
tenement dwelling-houses, or houses let in lodgings to members of more than
one family, common lodging-houses, canal boats used as dwellings, and
movable dwellings, such as tents, caravans, and sheds; also certain premises
not used as dwellings—as schools, factories, workshops, laundries, and bakehouses;
and also slaughter-houses, cowsheds, dairies, and milk-shops, and
offensive trade premises.