Hints from the Health Department. Leaflet from the archive of the Society of Medical Officers of Health. Credit: Wellcome Collection, London
[Report of the Medical Officer of Health for Hampstead Borough]
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195
Air Raid Precautions.
Of the multifarious duties allotted to the Medical Officer of
Health during the past half century, there are few which compare with
the tasks which have recently been given him in the preparation of Air
Raid Precautions Schemes. The administration of a scheme for protection
against air raids, and for the treatment of the injured should
such air raids take place, is now a statutory obligation on the local
authority, and as such must be carried out. Most medical officers of
health will view their new obligations with a certain amount of misgiving,
but this misgiving will not be because they do not think them
sufficiently important. Rather is it due to a feeling that, for some
months to come, a disproportionate amount of his time will have to be
given to the drawing-up of his part of the scheme, with the thousand
and one details of organisation involved. The Council have appreciated
this fact and have agreed that "New Schemes must take second
place to work in connection with Air Raid Precautions that so far as
the call upon the time of the Chief Officers and their staffs is concerned,
priority should be given to Air Raid Precautions work."
The drawing up of a paper scheme for first-aid parties and posts
is more difficult than most of the tasks with which the Medical Officer
of Health is confronted. How many casualties can be reasonably
expected? Will gas be used? Will sufficient skilled voluntary nursing
assistance be available? How long will the air raids last—a week, or
a few months? Will the bomber always get through?
In this task the administrator cannot learn by experience. He may
alter his scheme, and change his mind, but, unless war comes, his
theories will remain theories. The Home Office may learn some lessons
from China and Barcelona, and they probably have studied the warfare
there closely, but conditions will be vastly different when two first-class
powers clash.
The task of preparation is so vast that most schemes must of
necessity be fluid, and each authority will modify its scheme many
times within the next few months, so, although there will be uniformity
in essentials, there will be wide disparity in details.
General opinion seems to be veering round to the view that gas
will not be used, and that the chief dangers to be expected will be high