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such works as may be necessary to make the house in all respects reasonably
fit for human habitation. There was a provision that if the house was in
such a condition that it could not, without reconstruction, be made fit
for human habitation the owner might say, " I will close it," and then there
would be no obligation on him to execute repairs or reconstruction. But
supposing the owner did not do that, and it was not a question of reconstruction, if the owner did not comply with the requisition of the local authority
the local authority might do it themselves, and any expenses incurred by
the local authority under this section could be recovered in a Court of Summary Jurisdiction, from the owner and those expenses were, if not paid, a
charge on the premises. Then came the question, who is the owner ? and
Parliament seemed to have contemplated that it might be difficult for the
local authority to find the owner. He may not be in the United Kingdom
at all; he may be of such kind of owner that it is difficult to get at and
so the statute defined "owner" (under the earlier Act it is the Public Health
Act, 1875, and under the later Act it is the London Act of 1891 in this case,
but as the two provisions are exactly the same it does not matter which it
is under)as meaning "the person for the time being receiving the rackrent
of the lands or premises in connexion with which the word is used, whether
on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person." Parliament
might have done several things. It might have said the agent is to be
liable only to the extent of the rent he receives, but they have not said
so. They have apparently assumed that the agent paying the money
that was claimed from him under this definition would have a legal right
of indemnity against the owner and they do not seem to have troubled
their heads as to what would happen if the owner had no money to pay
the agent, and consequently no doubt this definition may lead to hard
cases. It may lead to a case where the agent is made liable for a very
considerable sum, much more than the rent he receives and he cannot
recover it from the owner because the owner has not got it. That was
no doubt a matter that Parliament ought to have considered, that it may
lead to hard cases. There is a well-known maxim (I do not know whether
it has got into Broome's Legal Maxims) to the effect that hard cases make
bad law. It is not for us to legislate because we think that Parliament
has used words which plainly create a hardship. We endeavour to avoid
hardship if we can, but our business is to interpret the words that Parliament
has used and not, under the guise of construing those words, legislate in a
manner in which Parliament does not legislate.
The question therefore arises in this case, as it will in every similar
case, was Mr. Watts, who has been hit for these expenses, receiving the
rackrent of the lands as agent for any other person ?
The facts are these and they are stated very carefully in the Special
Case of the Police Magistrate.
The three houses in this case, which were obviously small houses in
a working class locality, belonged originally to a Mr. Edward James Henry
Wallis, and while he was alive he employed a Mr. Spicer, a builder, to collect
the rents of the houses. Mr. Wallis died in February, 1922, and apparently
in the month before his death he made two contradictory wills; one left
two of the houses to his widow and one to his son, the other disposed of
the houses in another way which is not stated, but proceedings in Probate
at once took place. The appellant, Mr. Watts, in those Probate proceedings
acted as solicitor for the widow. It is not stated whether anybody acted
as solicitor for the son, but apparently the widow's and the son's interests
were the same. The son-in-law was propounding the other will. Ultimately those Probate actions were settled ; they were settled on the terms
that the three houses should be sold and out of the proceeds the Plaintiff's
costs of action were to be paid, the balance of the proceeds were to be
divided and paid as to one-third to the son and as to two-thirds to the
widow. The son-in-law apparently got his costs out of the estate or his
legal advisers did. The date of that is not given in the exhibit. On the
death of Mr. Wallis the son-in-law had directed Mr. Spicer to go on collecting
the rents. On the 23rd February, 1922, the appellant, who was solicitor