London's Pulse: Medical Officer of Health reports 1848-1972

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Greenwich 1911

The annual report made to the Council of the Metropolitan Borough of Greenwich for the year 1911

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80
they had not executed certain works, and the absence of these
works made it come out on both occasions, then I could have
understood it being spoken of as a recrudescence, but on the
facts here, 'recrudescence' can only mean 'occurring again.
In my judgment that is shown by the fact that the Magistrate
has found that it was not a continuance of the nuisance. If
it is not a continuance of the nuisance it is a fresh nuisance;
therefore, I do not think that the use of the word ' recrudescence
' shows that the Magistrate meant that the Respondents
had made default. The only other observation I have to
make is that we came to an exactly similar conclusion in the
case of Battersea Borough Council v. Georg supra, that you
may have a second nuisance (from possibly the same cause)
which is not a continuance, and which the notice is intended
to bring to an end; in other words, that there was not of
necessity any default when it occurred. I think, therefore,
that the decision of the Magistrate was quite right, and the
appeal must be dismissed."
Pickford, J.—"I agree. Some little difficulty seems to
have been occasioned by the use of the word 'recrudescence,'
but what the Magistrate meant by it I think is perfectly clear
when one looks at the end of paragraph 5 and at paragraph
6 of the case. The end of paragraph 5 says: 'It was further
contended on behalf of the Respondents that the statutory
notice of November 5th, 1910, had been complied with,
inasmuch as the nuisance of October 24th, 1910, therein
referred to had been abated, and that the nuisance arising
on the 9th April, 1911, was a separate and independent occurrence
unconnected with the nuisance of October 24th, 1910.'
Paragraph 6 says: 'In reply to this contention it was argued
on behalf of the Appellants that the existence of the nuisance
on the 9th April, 1911, must be taken as evidence that the
Respondents failed to comply with the requirements of the
notice which required abatement, and further required the
respondents to do what was necessary to prevent the