London's Pulse: Medical Officer of Health reports 1848-1972

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Islington 1903

Forty-eighth annual report on the health and sanitary condition of the Borough of Islington

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196
1908]
Now, taking the case that was first argued, the Stepney case, the abjection that I
take to this bye-law and the ground upon which I think the bye-law is unreasonable (byelaw
14) is that it includes or may include a class of people who are not legally responsible
and not morally responsible, without properly safeguarding them before they can
be made liable for a criminal offence. The words are : " The landlord of a lodging-house
" shall in the first week of the month of April in every year, cause every part of the
" premises to be cleansed," and bye-law 19 says, " Any person who shall offend against
" any of the foregoing bye-laws shall be liable for every such offence to a penalty of £5."
Now, the word "cause" is, of course, the word that gives rise to the difficulty. If
" cause " could be constructed to mean " take reasonable steps," that is to say, make a
contract with his tenants, or something of that kind, the same difficulty would not have
arisen, but I think very properly in the interest of sanitation and in the interest of the
good working of this kind of Act, " cause " does not mean merely " take steps," but " shall see
that the thing is done." Therefore, we have the bye-law providing that the person upon
whom the duty is cast was to see the thing done.
Now I turn back to "landlord," and I find that landlord in these bye-laws includes
in relation to a house or part of a house which is let in lodgings or occupied by members
of more than one family, the person (whatever may be the nature or extent of his
interest in the premises, and whether he resides on the premises or not) who receives
or is entitled to receive the rack rent of a lodging house. Now, I do not read the definition
of " keeper " from these bye-laws for the moment, because I quite agree that there
would be less objection to the bye-law if it were confined to a person who really had
what I may call the personal management of the house.
I think this view is again confirmed by analogy by the same kind of argument as I
pointed out with reference to Nokes' case, where the question was the supply of watercloset
accommodation. The Act, by section 4, sub-section 3, makes provision that where
the nuisance arises from any want or defect of a structural character, or where the
premises are unoccupied, then notice shall be served upon the owner, and where the
person causing the nuisance cannot be found, and it is clear that the nuisance does not
arise from or sufferance of the occupier, or owner, of the premises, the Sanitary Authority
may themselves abate the nuisance and may themselves do the work. Only by way of
analogy, I point out that the Act seems at places to draw a distinction between the
occupier, who would be responsible, or who ought to look after these things, and the
owner. It seems to me that the objection to the bye-law, not any objection to the Local
Authority making a proper bye-law which deals with the matter, is that a person who
may have taken an agreement from a responsible agent, who is going to let the house in
lodgings, would be held to be liable on the ground that he was entitled to receive the
rack rent, and he had not caused it to be done.
I think it right to say that I attach no importance to the objections taken by two
of the counsel—I am not quite sure which they were—to the suggestion that he would
not have a right of entry. I think it perfectly obvious that, under an ordinary agreement
rights of entry would be reserved, or ought to be reserved, in order to justify a
landlord and enable a landlord to see that the law is obeyed.
I wish further to say this. I see no objection to a bye-law which puts the responsibility
on the landlord, even though he may be the man who is merely entitled to the
rent. What I think is that any such bye-law ought to be made with reference to such
a man's position, and ought, in fact, provide that, in the case in which there is some
person who is liable, or may be liable, to a landlord to fulfil the obligation of the statute,
the landlord himself should not be subjected to a criminal charge without notice being
given to him.