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re-enactment of the clause in the Act of 1853 (section 9) upon
which the case of Pilcher v. Stafford was decided, but it is
important to refer to it again in connexion with the changes of
the law contained in other sections of the Act.
A point of some importance has been raised with reference
to the construction of section 29. It will be observed that it
provides that every parent or person having the custody of a
child who neglects to have the child vaccinated ' and shall not
render a reasonable excuse for his neglect' shall be guilty of
an offence and be liable to be proceeded against, and upon
conviction to pay a penalty. It has been contended that this
points to the reasonable excuse being rendered before proceedings
are taken. There is much to be said for this contention. The
parent ' guilty of an offence' and ' liable to be proceeded against'
is one who neglects and shall not render a reasonable excuse for
his neglect. The section does not say that the parent who,
without reasonable excuse, neglects to have his child vaccinated,
shall be guilty of an offence, as one would expect if the intention
were that the excuse should be rendered to the magistrate as a
defence when proceedings have been instituted. The section is
certainly so framed as to afford countenance to the contention we
are considering. On the other hand, no body or person is indicated
to whom an excuse can be rendered before the proceedings are
instituted. There is no machinery provided for hearing and
adjudicating upon excuses at that period and for giving a certificate
that a reasonable excuse has been rendered to serve as a bar to
further proceedings. On the whole, then, although it is not for
us to express an opinion on the legal construction of the clause,
which is very unhappily framed, it would probably be construed
as intending that the excuse should be rendered to the tribunal
before which proceedings for the neglect to vaccinate are pending.
We now come to the much-discussed section 31. It seems
probable that section 31 was enacted for the very purpose of
supplementing the provisions of section 29. Its purpose seemed
to be to enable those who prosecuted (and this duty had by