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175
foretell what call might then be made on hospital accomodation
if all those attacked by the disease were to be isolated? A priori
reasoning on such a question is of little or no value.
We can see nothing, then, to warrant the conclusion that in
this country vaccination might safely be abandoned, and replaced
by a system of isolation. If such a change were made in our
method of dealing with Small-Pox, and that which had been
substituted for vaccination proved ineffectual to prevent the
spread of the disease (it is not suggested that it could diminish
its severity in those attacked), it is impossible to contemplate the
consequences without dismay.
To avoid misunderstanding, it may be well to repeat that
we are very far from underating the value of a system of isolation.
We have already dwelt upon its importance. But what it can
accomplish as an auxiliary to vaccination is one thing, whether it
can be relied on in its stead is quite another thing.
Our attention has been drawn to the circumstance that outbreaks
of Small-Pox have not unfrequently had their origin in the
introduction of the disease to common lodging-houses by tramps
wandering from place to place. In view of this we make the
following recommendations:—
(i.) That common shelters which are not now subject to the
law relating to common lodging-houses should be made
subject to such law.
(ii.) That there shall be power to the local authority to
require medical examination of all persons entering
common lodging-houses and casual wards to see if they
are suffering from Small-Pox, and to offer a reward for
prompt information of the presence of the disease.
(iii.) That the local authority shall have power to order the
keeper of a common lodging-house in which there has
been Small-Pox to refuse fresh admissions for such
time as may be required by the authority.